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Abstract: A price reveal auction (PRA) is a descending price auction in which the
current price of the item on sale is hidden. Buyers can privately observe the price
only by paying a fee, and every time an agent does so, the price falls by a
predetermined amount. We show that if the number of participants, n, is common
knowledge, then in equilibrium a PRA replicates the outcome of a posted price
mechanism. In particular, at most one buyer observes the price and the auction
immediately finishes. In contrast, multiple entries can occur and profitability is
enhanced when agents are uncertain about n. Under some conditions, a PRA may
even yield higher expected revenues than standard auction formats.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes a novel online selling mechanism, the price reveal auction
(PRA). A PRA is a descending price auction in which the current price of the item
on sale is not publicly observable. Each participant can privately observe the
price by paying a fee, c. The agent is then given a limited amount of time (say,
10 sec) to decide if he wants to buy the good at the current price. If the agent
buys the good, the auction ends. Otherwise, the price is decreased by a fixed
amount, Δ < c, and the auction continues.1 In other words, in a PRA, the price is
*Corresponding author: Andrea Gallice, ESOMAS Department, University of Turin, Torino, Italy;
Collegio Carlo Alberto, Via Real Collegio 30 Moncalieri, Italy, E-mail: andrea.gallice@unito.it
1 PRAs were introduced in late 2009. Nowadays, they are taking place on a number of different
websites in different countries, such as for instance http://u-wantit.com/, http://1250auctions.
com/ (both in English), http://ambetion.com/ (in Spanish), and https://www.youbid.nl (in
Dutch). Notice that the PRA mechanism is sometimes also labelled “scratch auction”, “express
auction”, or “reverse auction”. Gallice and Sorrenti (2015) document that PRAs are typically
used to sell electronic products (smartphones, laptops, digital cameras) and report an average
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hidden and falls by Δ every time a bidder observes it.2 Therefore, and contrary to
standard Dutch auction procedures, the price does not fall exogenously at a
predetermined speed, but rather endogenously in response to bidders’ behavior.
The goal of this paper is to study the PRA format from a theoretical point of view.
We believe that this may be interesting for a number of reasons. First, a full-fledged
analysis of the mechanism is still missing.3 Indeed, we show that participants in a
PRA face a rather unusual strategic situation with non-trivial equilibria. Second, the
analysis allows us to assess some fundamental aspects of the mechanism. Does a
PRA implement an efficient allocation? Is a PRA revenue equivalent to standard
auction formats? These are relevant questions, since PRAs, together with similar
mechanisms that we will shortly review, may potentially find applications also in
non-commercial contexts. For instance, they may be used for charity purposes and/
or fund-raising activities (see Morgan 2000 or Engers and McManus 2007).4 Third,
results that stem from the theoretical analysis can be tested against the data. It is
relatively easy to collect field and/or experimental data about agents’ actual beha-
vior. The comparison between theoretical predictions and empirical results can then
highlight if and how agents deviate from the rational paradigm and, perhaps,
convey some more general lessons about individuals’ actual behavior. Finally,
PRAs are a specific example of a fast-growing wave of new forms of e-commerce.
These mechanisms not only include auction-based formats but also other peculiar
institutions, such as “pay what you want” mechanisms and platforms that match
buyers and sellers in various markets (short-term property rentals, car sharing, etc.).
A sound knowledge of existing mechanisms is thus needed to assess the peculia-
rities, risks, and prospects of those that will follow. In this respect, theoretical
insights may become useful in advising market design and in protecting consumers.
We model a PRA as a sequential game with imperfect information. First, the
seller sets the initial price. Then, a number of buyers with heterogeneous and
private valuations decide if and when to observe the hidden price. A player that
market value of the auctioned item of approximately 443€, an average fee (c) of 1.07€, and an
average price decrese (Δ) of 0.53€.
2 Notice that the decision to observe the price remains private. Therefore, no buyer can infer
the current price by counting the number of times the price has been observed.
3 Initial attempts to formally analyze the PRA format are Gallice (2010) and Di Gaetano (2011).
However, both papers relied on a number of simplifying assumptions that made the models
considerably different with respect to the actual mechanism. In particular, Gallice (2010) assumed
that the initial price was commonly known and only buyers with a valuation below that level could
participate. Di Gaetano (2011) assumed instead that the starting price is a random variable that is
not strategically chosen by the seller and that every buyer could observe the price only once.
4 Indeed, some charities are already using the PRA mechanism, e. g., http://www.greendealauc
tion.co.uk/en/.
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observes the price must also decide whether to buy the item or not. We character-
ize the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game and discuss the different outcomes
that can emerge on the equilibrium path. Given that observing the price is costly,
in equilibrium an agent decides to do so only when he is confident that the hidden
price has reached a “good” level, i. e., a level at which the agent is willing to
purchase the item. Agents’ behavior thus depends on their beliefs about the
hidden price. Our analysis show how these beliefs, in turn, hinge on agents’
information set and particularly on their knowledge about some “fundamentals”
of the game. In this respect, we consider two different scenarios.
In the first scenario (which is in line with the standard approach in auction
theory, e. g., Krishna 2002), we postulate that the only aspect about which
agents are uncertain is the other buyers’ type (i. e., their valuation of the
good). In particular, we assume that the number of participants (n) and the
valuation of the seller (vs) are common knowledge. We show that in such a
situation, uncertainty about the hidden price disappears. The intuition is that,
since the optimal initial price is a deterministic function of n and vs, common
knowledge about these parameters leads to common knowledge about the initial
price. This, in turn, implies that, in equilibrium, the hidden price is observed at
most once by a single bidder. The auction then either immediately finishes (i. e.,
an agent observes the price and buys the item as soon as the auction opens) or
reaches the final period with no player ever observing the price (i. e., the item
remains unsold). We also show that, in such a context, a PRA replicates the
same outcome that would emerge in a posted price mechanism (PPM). As such,
a PRA yields lower expected revenues than standard auction formats and
implements an allocation that is not necessarily efficient.
The second scenario more closely resembles real PRAs that take place on
the Internet, as it assigns buyers a less precise information set. In particular,
we consider the case in which buyers are uncertain about the number of
participants. Since a different optimal initial price exists for every possible
realization of n, uncertainty about the number of participants translates into
uncertainty about the initial price. Agents’ beliefs are thus described by a non-
degenerate probability distribution and buyers choose whether to observe the
price or not on the basis of their expected payoffs. In particular, a buyer may
rationally decide to observe the price, discover a price that is above his will-
ingness to pay, and thus refuse to buy the item. It follows that the price may
fall even on the equilibrium path. The final allocation may again fail to be
efficient but multiple entries enhance expected revenues. Indeed, we show
that, under some quite specific conditions (high number of participants paired
with highly dispersed beliefs), a PRA may dominate standard auction formats
in terms of expected revenues.
Price Reveal Auctions 487
Brought to you by | Universita Studi di Torino
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/21/16 9:36 AM
1.1 PRAs Versus Other Pay-Per-Bid Auctions
PRAs share some similarities with two other recent on-line selling mechanisms:
penny auctions and lowest unique bid auctions (LUBAs). The three formats are
collectively referred to as pay-per-bid auctions.5 This labelling indicates two dis-
tinguishing features of this family of mechanisms. First, these are formats in which
the participants must pay the seller a fee every time they “move” (and these fees
constitute the main source of revenues for the seller). Second, these mechanisms
are, at least at first sight, reminiscent of standard auction formats. In this section,
we briefly describe the functioning of penny auctions and LUBAs. We also discuss
their main theoretical properties in light of our findings about PRAs. Finally, we
report some figures about the actual performance of the three mechanisms.
In a penny auction, buyers observe a public countdown (say, 30 sec). Every
time an agent bids, the current price of the item increases by a fixed amount (a
penny) and the countdown restarts. The winner is the bidder who holds the
winning bid when the countdown expires. Penny auctions have been studied
extensively. Hinnosaar (2014) fully characterized the equilibria in a very general
framework, whereas Augenblick (forthcoming) and Platt, Price, and Tappen
(2013) analyzed more specific versions of the mechanism and later focused on
an empirical analysis. A common result of the three models is that the support of
possible final prices is highly dispersed. This follows from the fact that, in
equilibrium, players use mixed strategies. Since all these papers assume that
bidders have homogeneous valuations, efficiency of the final allocation and
revenue equivalence with standard auction formats hold trivially; however,
and in line with what we find in the case of PRAs, these two properties would
not necessarily hold if one allows for heterogeneity in buyer types.6
In a LUBA, bidders place private bids and the winner is the agent who
submits the lowest offer that is not matched by any other bid. A number of
papers (Rapoport et al. 2009; Houba, van der Laan, and Veldhuizen 2011; Östling
et al. 2011) investigate the theoretical properties of such a mechanism under the
restriction that each player submits a single bid. Other papers (Eichberger and
Vinogradov 2008; Gallice 2009; Scarsini, Solan, and Vieille (2010) allow instead
5 Notice, however, that in the literature, the term pay-per-bid auctions is sometimes synon-
ymous with penny auctions.
6 From an empirical point of view, Augenblick (forthcoming), Hinnosaar (2014), and Platt,
Price, and Tappen (2013) documented actual profits that are, on average, considerably larger
than those that theory would predict. Augenblick (forthcoming) rationalized this inconsistency
by assuming that bidders may suffer from the sunk-cost fallacy. Platt, Price, and Tappen (2013)
postulated instead that bidders may be risk lovers rather than risk neutral. Finally, Gnutzmann
(2014) provided an additional explanation based on prospect theory.
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for multiple bids. A common finding of all these studies is that, in equilibrium,
bidders randomize over the support of possible bids according to a decreasing
probability distribution. Similarly to penny auctions, these studies show that a
LUBA may fail to implement an efficient allocation when the bidders are
heterogeneous. Gallice (2009) and Scarsini, Solan, and Vieille (2010) also inves-
tigate the profitability of the mechanism and show that if bidders are fully
rational, a LUBA yields expected revenues that can at most match those that a
standard auction format would raise.
Although penny auctions, LUBAs, and PRAs are relatively similar in terms of
some key theoretical aspects of their equilibria, the differences in their actual
performance are quite pronounced. In the case of penny auctions, Augenblick
(forthcoming) and Hinnosaar (2014) report average profit margins of, respec-
tively, 51% and 71%. Moreover, Platt, Price, and Tappen (2013) find that the final
price amounts, on average, to 10% of the retail price, i. e., an average discount
of 90%. Concerning LUBAs, Gallice (2009) reports a profit margin of 441% and
an average discount of 99%. Finally, in the case of PRAs, Gallice and Sorrenti
(2015) document a profit margin of 36% and an average discount of 37%. In
practice, the PRA mechanism thus appears to be less rewarding for both the
seller and the winning agent. In line with this finding, PRAs are nowadays less
widespread than penny auctions or LUBAs.
2 The Model
We model the sale of a single indivisible item through a price reveal auction.
There are n+ 1 risk-neutral players: a seller (indexed by s) and a finite set
N = 1, ..., nf g of potential buyers. We will investigate two different scenarios: in
the first one (Section 3.2), the number of participants, n, is common knowledge
among all players. In the second one (Section 3.3), buyers are uncertain about n.
The seller’s valuation of the good is given by vs ≥0, and this is commonly
known.7 Each buyer has a valuation vi that is independently and identically
distributed on the interval 0,v½ , according to the cumulative distribution func-
tion F, which is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable with density f
and such that v > vs. In line with the standard independent private value assump-
tion, each buyer knows his type vi and all players know that every vj≠ i is drawn
from F.
7 We will later investigate (see Section 4) how the results of the model would change under the
alternative assumption that vs is unknown to potential buyers. In particular, we will show that
buyers’ uncertainty about vs triggers similar effects as the ones caused by uncertainty about n.
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Time is discrete and goes from t =0 to t = te where te 2 1, ..., Tf g denotes the
ending period and T is finite and common knowledge. In particular, te ≤T if an
agent buys the item whereas te = T if the item remains unsold. At t =0 the seller
sets the price p0 2 0,v½ . The initial price p0, as well as the current price pt for
any t 2 1, ..., tef g, are unknown to potential buyers unless agents explicitly
decide to observe it. The price remains constant whenever no one observes it.
On the contrary, two things simultaneously and instantaneously happen as soon
as an agent observes the price: first, the agent is charged the fee c > 0; second,
the price decreases from pt − 1 to pt = pt − 1 −Δ with Δ 2 0, cð Þ.8
At any period t 2 1, ..., tef g, each agent i 2 N plays a sequence of two actions
that we denote with ai, t = a1i, t, a
2
i, t
 
. Action a1i, t is such that a
1
i, t 2 ;,wtof g, where
a1i, t = ; indicates that the player remains inactive whereas a1i, t =wto indicates that
the player informs the seller that he is willing to observe the hidden price (and thus
willing to pay the fee c). In line with the actual tie-breaking rule, we then assume
that the seller randomly selects within the set of all players who played a1i, t =wto a
single agent to whom he discloses the price.9 We denote this agent by i^t. Once i^t
privately observes pt 2 0, v½ , he plays action a2i^t , t = γðptÞ where γðÞ : 0, v½  ! 0, 1f g
indicates whether the agent buys the good (γðptÞ= 1) or not (γðptÞ=0). All agents
i≠ i^t necessarily play a2i^t , t = ;.
Finally, let ηi, t 2 N0 be the number of times agent i observes the price (and
thus pays the fee c) up to period t included. Players’ final payoffs at period
te 2 1, ..., Tf g thus take the following form:10
ui =
vi − pte − cηi, te if i buys the good
− cηi, te otherwise
(
for i 2 N
us =
pte − vs + c
P
i2N ηi, te if there exists an i that buys the good
c
P
i2N ηi, te otherwise
(
8 Notice that an agent that observes pt discovers a price that has already been decreased by Δ.
In general, and consistent with the actual implementation of the mechanism (see the figures
reported in footnote 1), we have in mind situations in which both c and Δ are “small”. We stress
from the outset that the condition Δ < c plays an important role in determining the equilibria of
the game and the profitability of the mechanism. We will discuss in Section 4 the alternative
assumption (which is never implemented in reality) Δ ≥ c.
9 From the FAQ section of the website bidster.com: “What happens if a participant has started
to purchase the product and someone else tries to buy it? If anyone has started the purchase of
the product, no other participants can scratch the auction. Only one participant can buy the
product and stand as the winner of the auction.”
10 We assume that players’ discount factor equals 1 so that we write ui (respectively, us) rather
than ui, te (respectively, us, te ).
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2.1 Buyers’ Information Sets
With respect to a standard descending price auction, the PRA mechanism thus
displays several peculiar features. Before moving to the proper analysis of the
equilibria, it is therefore useful to discuss in more detail how these specific
features affect buyers’ information sets throughout the game. Clearly, an
important characteristic of a PRA is that agents’ actions (and thus histories
of play) are unobservable. Assume agent i plays ai, t = ;, ;ð Þ. Then, from i‘s
point of view, actions aj, t = ;, ;ð Þ (agent j≠ i remains inactive), aj, t = wto, ;ð Þ
(agent j informs the seller that he is willing to observe the price but he loses in
a tie), and aj, t = wto, 0ð Þ (agent j observes the price but decides not to buy the
good) are indistinguishable. Indeed, the three actions are observationally
equivalent, as in all cases agent i only observes that the auction remains
open. This implies that in general, at any period t > 1, agents do not know
how many times (if any) the price was observed. The only (partial) exception to
this rule arises because of the possibility of ties. In this respect, an agent that
observes the price does not know if he was involved in a tie or not. As such, he
cannot infer any new information about what the opponents played. On the
contrary, an agent that loses in a tie learns that someone else is currently
observing the price (notice however that the agent does not know how many
players were tied together). If the agent then sees that the auction remains
open, he infers that the rival who observed the price did not buy the item. As
such, he realizes that the hidden price felt from pt to pt + 1 = pt −Δ. All these
considerations will play an important role in determining the way buyers
update their beliefs throughout the game. They also imply that buyers may
hold heterogeneous beliefs as these depend on each agent’s specific and
private history of play.
3 The Equilibria of The Game
A PRA is thus an extensive-form game with imperfect information, as players do
not always know pt and do not observe their rivals’ types and actions. As a
solution concept, we apply the notion of symmetric perfect Bayesian equili-
brium. As it is often the case in Bayesian games, multiple equilibria exist.
Different systems of beliefs may in fact sustain different equilibria. We focus
however on what we call the “profit maximizing trading equilibrium” (PMTE) of
the game. This is an equilibrium in which the seller maximizes his expected
profits, buyers hold consistent beliefs, and trading potentially (but not
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necessarily) occurs.11 The criterion of profit maximization seems an appropriate
approach to guide equilibrium selection. Notice in fact that the seller is the first
player to move (he sets the initial price). Moreover, and as already mentioned,
the goal of a PRA is not the implementation of an efficient allocation but rather
the creation of profits for the seller. Before properly defining the PMTE
(Proposition 1 for the case in which n is common knowledge, Proposition 3 for
the case in which n is a random variable), we first discuss some of its character-
istics and introduce some additional notations.
3.1 Some Preliminary Results
The rules of the game are such that buyers accumulate costs every time they
observe the price. Therefore, an agent would ideally observe the hidden price
only once, discover a price pt = pt − 1 −Δ that he likes, and buy the item. The
decision to observe pt thus depends on the beliefs the agent holds about the
hidden price pt − 1. Let Hi, t pt − 1ð Þ be a probability distribution that describes
such beliefs and hi, t pt − 1ð Þ be the associated density function. Given that the
agent internalizes the fact that if he observes the price at period t, he is
charged c, and the price moves from pt − 1 to pt = pt − 1 −Δ, the expected payoff
associated with the decision of observing the price can be formulated as
follows:
πijHi, t pt − 1ð Þð Þ=
ðv
0
hi, t pt − 1ð Þ vi − pt − 1 +Δð Þqi, t ptð Þdpt − 1 − c [1]
where qi, t ptð Þ 2 0, 1f g indicates the outcome of the purchasing decision for any
possible realization of the actual price pt = pt − 1 −Δ. In particular, qi, t ptð Þ= 1
(respectively, qi, t ptð Þ =0) if, conditional upon observing pt, the agent decides
to buy (resp., not to buy) the item. Formally:
qi, t ptð Þ=
0 if pt > bðviÞ
1 if pt ≤ bðviÞ
(
[2]
where bðviÞ denotes the agent’s gross willingness to pay (to be identified in
equilibrium). Notice that the agent anticipates that at the moment of deciding
whether to buy the item or not, the cost of the fee, c, is sunk and thus will not
affect his decision any more.
11 We will also show the existence of a “no trading equilibrium” in which the item certainly
remains unsold.
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Given that agents are risk neutral and that the strategy of never observing
the price leads to a null payoff, a player will observe the hidden price whenever
πijHi, t pt − 1ð Þð Þ > 0. When this is the case, the actual decision to buy the item or
not will then depend on how the actual price that the agent discovers, pt,
compares with his gross willingness to pay, bðviÞ.
In summary, potential buyers should play according to the following
behavioral rule: be willing to observe the price whenever the transaction is
expected to be beneficial, and then, in case the player does indeed observe the
price, buy the item whenever the actual realization of pt is beneficial.
12
Formally, ai, t = a1i, t, a
2
i, t
 
where:
a1i, t =
; if πijHi, t pt − 1ð Þð Þ ≤0
wto if πijHi, t pt − 1ð Þð Þ > 0
(
for any i 2 N
a2i, t =
γ ð Þ with γ ptð Þ=0 if pt > bðviÞ
γ ð Þ with γ ptð Þ= 1 if pt ≤ bðviÞ.
8<
: for i= i^t and a2i, t = ; for any i≠ i^t.
[3]
3.2 The Equilibria When n is Common Knowledge
Assume that the number of participants is common knowledge among all the
players. Then, in equilibrium, a PRA attracts, at most, one price observation by
a single bidder. Moreover, when this is the case, the auction immediately
finishes.
The intuition for such a result is that perfect information about the number
of participants leads to perfect information about the initial price that the seller
sets. Players can solve the seller’s problem and correctly pin down p*0.
13 As such,
uncertainty disappears and bidders’ beliefs about the initial price, as well as
about how this evolves over time, become deterministic. More formally, agents’
beliefs are described by the degenerate distribution H*i, t pt − 1ð Þ with h*i, t p*t − 1
 
= 1
for all i 2 N.
12 Say that c= 2, Δ= 1, vi = 100, bðviÞ= 100, and the agent’s beliefs about pt − 1 are such that
hi, t 90ð Þ=0.3 and hi, t 110ð Þ=0.7. Then, qi, t 89ð Þ= 1 and qi, t 109ð Þ=0 such that πijHi, t pt − 1ð Þð Þ=
0.3ð100− 89Þ− 2 = 1.3. Agent i thus signals his willingness to observe the price. If given this oppor-
tunity, he will then buy the item if pt = 89 and not buy it if pt = 109.
13 Here and in what follows we use the asterisk * to indicate equilibrium prices, actions, and
beliefs.
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Indeed, consider the game from the point of view of a potential buyer. By
knowing n, the agent is able to compute p*0. He thus anticipates that if he observes
the price in t = 1, he will discover p*1 = p
*
0 −Δ. As such, the agent has no reason to
pay the fee c for learning a price that he already knows, unless he is willing to buy
the item at p*1 . By symmetry, the agent also anticipates that all other players adopt
the same behavior. Therefore, if at t = 2 the auction is still open, it necessarily
means that no one observed the price. As such, p*1 = p
*
0. The same reasoning then
applies to subsequent periods, such that on the equilibrium path the hidden price
cannot fall. Each agent thus decides what to do by comparing his net willingness
to pay b*ðviÞ− c with p*1 = p*0 −Δ. In particular, whenever the agent finds the
transaction beneficial, he will observe the price and buy the item as soon as he
can, i. e., at t = 1. Indeed, and exactly because the price cannot fall in equilibrium,
by postponing the purchase an agent can only lose when preempted by a rival.
The fact that, in equilibrium, the price cannot fall obviously influences
agents’ willingness to pay and thus ultimately determines the profitability of
the mechanism. In particular, we will show that agents’ gross willingness to pay
coincides with their private valuation (i. e., b*ðviÞ= vi). Perhaps more surpris-
ingly, we will show that when n is common knowledge, a PRA essentially
replicates the outcome of a posted price mechanism (PPM). As such, a PRA
raises lower revenues with respect to standard auction formats.
Proposition 1: In a “profit maximizing trading equilibrium” (PMTE) of a PRA in
which n is common knowledge, the seller sets the initial price p*0 = argmax
p02 vs +Δ − c, v +Δ − c½ 
πs
where πs (the seller’s expected profits) is defined as follows:
πs = 1− F p0 −Δ+ cð Þ½ nð Þðp0 −Δ+ c− υsÞ [4]
Each agent i 2 N plays a*i, t
 te
t = 1
where a*i, t = a
*1
i, t, a
*2
i, t
 
is such that:
a*1i, t =
; if πi j H*i, t pt − 1ð Þ
 
≤0
wto if πi j H*i, t pt − 1ð Þ
 
> 0
(
for any i 2 N
a*2i, t =
γ ð Þ with γ ptð Þ =0 if pt > b*ðviÞ
γ ð Þ with γ ptð Þ = 1 if pt ≤ b*ðviÞ
(
for i= i^t and a*2i, t = ; for any i≠ i^t
and πijH*i, t pt − 1ð Þ
 
is as defined in [1], H*i, t pt − 1ð Þ is such that h*i, t pt − 1 = p*0
 
= 1 for
any i 2 N and any t, b*ðviÞ= vi for any i 2 N, and te 2 1,Tf g.14
14 A system of off-path beliefs that supports the equilibrium is the following:
– Agent i^t: H ′i^t , t ptð Þ with h
′
i^t , t
pt = p′t
 
= 1 where p′t ≠p
*
t is the non equilibrium price that i^t
observes. An agent that observes p′t thus acknowledges the fact that his initial beliefs were
wrong and updates them accordingly. Notice however that the agent cannot renege from
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Proof: In the appendix. ■
Proposition 1 implies that, on the equilibrium path, only two situations can arise:
(1) An agent observes the price in t = 1, and immediately buys the item.
(2) No agent ever observes the price and the item remains unsold.
In the first case, the mechanism raises positive profits; in the second, it raises
zero profits. Which of these two equilibrium outcomes occurs depends on how the
actual realization of agents’ types combines with the initial price, p*0. When trade
occurs (case 1), the allocation may fail to be efficient; in fact, whenever more than
one agent is willing to observe the price in t = 1, the tie-breaking rule randomly
selects the player to whom the price is actually disclosed. It follows that the agent
who buys the good is not necessarily the one with the highest valuation.15
The following example illustrates the two possible equilibrium outcomes as
well as the potential inefficiency of the final allocation:
Example 1: Consider a price reveal auction with N = 1, 2, 3f g, F⁓U 0, 150½ , vs =0,
c= 2, and Δ= 1. The optimal initial price thus maximizes πs = 1−ð
1
150 p0 + 1ð Þ
 3ðp0 + 1Þ. Therefore, p*0 = 93.49 and πs p*0 = 70.87. As such, every
agent with valuation vi > v = 94.49 has a positive expected payoff (v solves
πi p*0
 
= v − 93.49 + 1− 2 = 0). Now consider three different cases concerning the
actual realizations of agents’ types:
– Case a½  (trade with efficient allocation): v1 = 40, v2 = 80, and v3 = 130. Then,
a*1i, 1 = ; for i 2 1, 2f g and a*13, 1 =wto. Therefore, i^1 = 3 and γ p*1
 
= 1 since
p*1 = 92.49. The auction ends at te = 1 and payoffs are u1 = 0, u2 = 0,
u3 = 35.51, and us = 94.49.
having played a*1i, t =wto. Notice also that action a
*2
i^t , t
still disciplines this contingency: the
agent is pragmatic and buys the item whenever p′t ≤ b
*ðviÞ.
– Generic agent i who played a*1i, t − 1 =wto but lost in a tie: H
′
i, t pt − 1ð Þ with h′i, t pt − 1 > við Þ= 1 for
any t. The agent sees that the auction remains open and thus infers that pt > p*t . In
particular, he loses confidence and assigns probability 1 to the event that the hidden
price is higher than his valuation. In line with the equilibrium strategy, the agent then
abstains from observing the price in any future period.
– Generic player i who played a*1i, t − 1 = ;: H ′i, t pt − 1ð Þ with h′i, t pt − 1 = p*t − 1
 
= 1. The agent does
not observe any deviation from the equilibrium path and thus his beliefs do not change.
15 In principle, the seller could use a truth-telling mechanism, such as discriminating among
agents that are tied together, and thus allocate the good in an efficient way. However, such a
mechanism seems difficult to implement in reality. Moreover, efficiency is not an objective that
the seller pursues. In Section 3.3, we will actually see that, in cases of ties, a profit-maximizing
seller may have incentives to give priority to agents with lower valuations.
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– Case b½  (trade with inefficient allocation): as in case a½  but with v2 = 100 such
that also agent 2 plays a*12, 1 =wto. The auction ends at te = 1 and with prob-
ability 12 leads to an inefficient allocation (i. e., i^1 = 2 and γ p
*
1
 
= 1 such that the
item goes to agent 2) with payoffs u1 = 0, u2 = 5.51, u3 = 0, and us = 94.49.
– Case c½  (no trade): as in case a½  but with v3 = 90. Then a*i, t
 T
t = 1
= ;, ;ð Þ for
any i 2 N. The auction ends at te =T, the item remains unsold, and payoffs
are ui =0 for any i 2 N and us =0.
Going back to Proposition 1, an interesting feature of the equilibrium is that
b*ðviÞ= vi, i. e., bidders’ gross willingness to pay coincides with their valuation.
The resulting net willingness to pay (vi − c) can thus be interpreted as the agent’s
valuation net of the cost of observing the price. As already mentioned, the
intuition for such a result is that agents realize that, on the equilibrium path,
the price cannot fall and thus decide what to do by comparing the payoff they
would get if they observe the price and buy the item at t = 1 (ui = vi − p*0 +Δ− c)
with the payoff they would get if they do not buy at all (ui =0).
16
In equilibrium, agents’ behavior is thus similar to the one they would adopt
in a PPM (take it or leave it offer). Indeed, the following proposition shows that
the two mechanisms are outcome equivalent.
Proposition 2: The PMTE of a PRA with common knowledge about n and optimal
initial price p*0 is outcome equivalent to a PPM with n buyers and optimal price
p*PPM = p
*
0 −Δ+ c. In particular, the two mechanisms yield the same expected
revenues.
Proof: Given any N, F, vs, and v1, ..., vnð Þ, consider the functions πs =
1− F xð Þ½ nð Þðx − vsÞ and ui = vi − x for i 2 N. Notice that when x = p0 −Δ+ c, the
function πs captures the seller’s expected profits in a PRA. Moreover, a buyer
i 2 N is willing to observe the price and buy the item if and only if ui > 0. Similarly,
when x = pPPM, πs describes the seller’s expected profits in a PPM and a buyer is
willing to buy the item if and only if ui > 0. As shown in the proof of Proposition 1,
the function πs is strictly convex such that it has a unique maximizer x*.
Therefore, the optimal initial price in a PRA is such that p*0 −Δ+ c= x
*, whereas
the optimal price in a PPM is such that p*PPM = x
*. It follows that p*PPM = p
*
0 −Δ+ c.
Furthermore, ui p*0
 
= ui p*PPM
 
and πs p*0
 
=πs p*PPM
 
, i. e., the two mechanisms
yield the same expected revenues. ■
16 Clearly, such a result is also driven by the fact that c >Δ, i. e., the private marginal cost of
observing the price exceeds the marginal benefit. As such, no agent can gain by repeatedly
observing the price with the goal of decreasing it on his own.
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Two noticeable results directly stem from having proved that the PMTE of a PRA
is outcome equivalent to a PPM. We present them in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: In the PMTE of a PRA, the optimal initial price and the expected
revenues are strictly increasing in n.
Proof: In a PPM the optimal price as well as the seller’s expected revenues are
strictly increasing in n (see Blumrosen and Holenstein 2008). By Proposition 2,
the same relationships thus holds also in the PMTE of a PRA. ■
Figure 1 illustrates the results of Lemma 1 in the context of a PRA with
F ⁓ U 0, 150½ , vs =0, c= 2, Δ= 1, and where the number of participants is given
by n 2 3, 30, 300f g.17
Lemma 2: The PMTE of a PRA with common knowledge about n yields lower
expected revenues than standard auction formats.
Proof: A PPM with optimal price p*PPM is revenue dominated by a standard
auction format with reserve price r = p*PPM . A fortiori, a PPM is thus dominated
by an auction in which the seller sets the reserve price optimally (see Myerson
1981, and Wang 1993). Because of Proposition 2, it then follows that a PRA yields
lower expected revenues than standard auction formats. ■
The following example illustrates the result of Lemma 2 in a context that
replicates the scenario introduced in Example 1.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
50
100
150
p0
π
s 
(p 0
)
 
 
n = 3
n = 30
n = 300
Figure 1 : Seller’s expected revenues.
17 Since we set vs =0, expected revenues coincide with expected profits. The lowest curve
(n= 3) depicts the scenario introduced in Example 1.
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Example 2: Let N = 1, 2, 3f g, F ⁓ U 0, 150½ , vs =0, and compare in terms of
expected revenues a PRA, a PPM, a first price auction (FPA), and a second price
auction (SPA). In a PRA (as in Example 1 we set c= 2 and Δ= 1), the seller sets
p*0 = 93.49 such that πPRA = 70.87. In a PPM, the seller sets p
*
PPM = 94.49 such that,
coherently with Proposition 2, πPPM = 70.87. In a FPA (respectively, SPA), the optimal
bid is given by b*FPAðviÞ = 23 vi (respectively, b*SPAðviÞ= vi). Therefore, with reserve price
r = 94.49, expected revenues are given by πFPA = πSPA = 77.06. With the optimal
reserve price r* = 75 (see Krishna 2002), expected revenues further increase to
πFPA =πSPA =81.25. Revenue equivalence among the four mechanisms thus does
not hold and, in particular, πPRA = πPPM <πFPA = πSPA.
Notice that as the number of participants tends toward infinity, the expected
revenues of both a PRA and a standard auction tend toward v. In particular, the
revenue gap between a PRA and a standard auction shrinks as the level of
participation increases. Such a relationship will play an important role when we
will discuss the expected profitability of a PRA with uncertainty about n.
Finally, as already mentioned, the PRA mechanism also features a “no
trading equilibrium”. In this equilibrium the seller sets an initial price
p*0 2 v − c+Δ, v½  (i. e., a price such that p*1 ≥ vi − c for any i 2 N) and, consistent
with the seller’s choice, all agents play a*i, t = ;, ;ð Þ at any t. The game ends at
te = T, the item remains unsold and final payoffs are ui =0 for any i 2 N and
us =0. The “no trading equilibrium” is Pareto dominated (at least in expecta-
tions) by the PMTE defined in Proposition 1 where, when trade actually occurs,
two players (the seller and the buyer) realize a positive payoff. As already
mentioned, given that the seller is the agent who sets up the game, and that
his goal is to obtain profits, the PMTE appears to be more relevant.
3.3 The Equilibria When n is Not Common Knowledge
Contrary to the previous section, assume now that the number of potential partici-
pants n is not common knowledge among all the players. More precisely, the seller
still knows n with certainty whereas the buyers do not. This different information
structure is certainlymore appropriate to capture the features of PRAs that take place
over the Internet, where indeed buyers do not know the number of rivals. Notice
however that, in order to participate, agentsmust first register on the seller’s website.
As such, while somehow stark (registration does not necessarily imply participa-
tion), the assumption that the seller knows n with certainty seems justifiable.18
18 We will relax this assumption and investigate what would happen in a situation in which all
the players (i. e., both the seller and the buyers) are equally uninformed in Section 4.
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This information asymmetry has important implications for what concerns
possible equilibrium outcomes and the profitability of the mechanism. Since the
optimal initial price that the seller sets is a function of the number of partici-
pants, uncertainty about n leads in fact to uncertainty about p*0. To see this
point, assume that, from the point of view of each agent i 2 N, the number of
participants is a random variable ~N. Let g ð Þ be the non-degenerate probability
mass function of ~N and S~N = ~nmin, ..., ~nmaxf g with ~nmin ≥ 1 its support. Agents’
beliefs about p*0 are then captured by the distribution Hi, 1 p0ð Þ, which is defined
over the support Sp*0 = p
*
0 ~nminð Þ, ..., p*0 ~nmaxð Þ
 
and assigns the probability mass
function hi, 1 p*0 ~nð Þ
 
= g ~nð Þ for every ~n 2 S~N , where p*0 ~nð Þ is the optimal initial
price the seller would set if the actual number of participants was n= ~n (indeed,
we will show that in equilibrium the seller faces the same problem, and thus
adopts the same behavior, as the ones described in Section 3.2). Uncertainty
about p*0, in turn, implies uncertainty about the current price p
*
t at any t ≥ 1. In
such an environment, agents still play according to the behavioral rule defined
in eq. [3], but now action a2
i^t , t
= γ ð Þ with γ p*t
 
=0 can be observed even on the
equilibrium path. Indeed, it may well be the case that an agent rationally
decides to observe the price, discovers an actual level that would instead lead
to a negative payoff, and thus decides not to buy the item. This implies that, in
equilibrium, the price may actually fall.
The following proposition formalizes these results:
Proposition 3: In a “profit maximizing trading equilibrium” (PMTE) of a PRA in
which n is uncertain, agents believe the initial price to be distributed over
Sp*0 = p
*
0 ~nminð Þ, ..., p*0 ~nmaxð Þ
 
according to the distribution H*i, 1 p0ð Þ that assigns
probability mass function hi, 1 p*0 ~nð Þ
 
= gð~nÞ for any ~n 2 ~nmin, ..., ~nmaxf g. Each
p*0 ~nð Þ is defined as p*0 ~nð Þ = arg max
p02 vs + Δ− c,v + Δ− c½ 
πs ~nð Þ where:
πs ~nð Þ= 1− F p0 −Δ+ cð Þ½ ~n
	 
ðp0 −Δ+ c− υsÞ
Each agent i 2 N plays a*i, t
 te
t = 1
where a*i, t = a
*1
i, t, a
*2
i, t
 
is such that:
a*1i, t =
; if πijH*i, t pt − 1ð Þ
 
≤0
wto if πijH*i, t pt − 1ð Þ
 
> 0
8<
: for any i 2 N
a*2i, t =
γ ð Þ with γ ptð Þ=0 if pt > b*ðυiÞ
γ ð Þ with γ ptð Þ= 1 if pt ≤ b*ðυiÞ
8<
: for i= i^t and a*2i, t = ; for any i≠ i^t
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and πijHi, t pt − 1ð Þð Þ is as in [1], agents’ beliefs H*i, t pt − 1ð Þ evolve from H*i, 1 p0ð Þ
according to Bayes’ rule, b*ðviÞ= vi for any i 2 N, and te 2 1, ..., Tf g.19
Proof: In the appendix. ■
The equilibrium is now characterized by three possible (classes of) outcomes:
(1) An agent observes the price in t = 1, and immediately buys the item.
(2) No agent ever observes the price and the item remains unsold.
(3) More than one agent observes the price and the auction ends at te 2 2, ..., Tf g.
The first two outcomes are analogous to the ones that characterize the PMTE
of a PRA in which n is common knowledge; the third one is instead specific of a
PRA where there is uncertainty about the number of participants. In this third
equilibrium outcome, the entry of multiple bidders and repeated observations of
the price can occur. The following example illustrates such a possibility:
Example 3: Consider a PRA where F ⁓ U 0, 150½ , vs =0, c= 2, and Δ= 1. Let
S~N = 1, ..., 5f g with g ~nð Þ=0.2 for every ~n 2 1, ..., 5f g. The actual number of partici-
pants is n=4 with v1 = 50, v2 = 88, v3 = 93, and v4 = 130. In equilibrium, the game
can thus unfold in the following way:
– period t = 1: agents’ initial beliefs are described by the distribution H*i, 1 p0ð Þ. More
precisely, all agents expect the initial price to be distributed over the support:
Sp*0 = 74, 85.6, 93.49, 99.31, 103.82f g
with probabilities 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2, 0.2ð Þ. As such, the choice of observing the
price leads to a positive expected payoff for any vi > vt = 1 = 83 where vt = 1 solves
πijH*i, 1 p0ð Þ
 
=0. Buyer 1 thus remains inactive whereas buyers 2, 3, and 4 are
willing to observe the price. With probability 13, buyer 2 is chosen. He observes
p*1 = 92.49, such that p
*
1 > v1 and thus does not buy the item.
– period t = 2: agent 1’s beliefs do not change (i. e., H*1, 2 p1ð Þ=H*1, 1 p0ð Þ) such that
the agent remains inactive. Agent 2’s beliefs are instead given by
h*1, 2 p
*
1 = 92.49
 
= 1; the agent thus also plays a*1, 2 = ;, ;ð Þ. Agents 3 and 4 instead
19 A system of off-path beliefs that supports the equilibrium is analogous to the one already
described in the case of Proposition 1 (see footnote 14). In particular:
– Agent i^t: H ′i^t , t ptð Þ with h
′
i^t , t
pt = p′t ~nð Þ
 
= 1 where p′t ~nð Þ≠p*t ~nð Þ is the non equilibrium price
that i^t observes.
– Generic agent i who played a*1i, t − 1 =wto but lost in a tie: H
′
i, t pt − 1ð Þ with h′i, t pt − 1 > við Þ= 1 for
any t.
– Generic player i who played a*1i, t − 1 = ;: H ′i, t pt − 1ð Þ=H*i, t pt − 1ð Þ.
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observe that the auction is still open. Therefore, they update their beliefs to
H*i, 2 p1ð Þ with i 2 3, 4f g and expect p*1 to be distributed over the support:
Sp*1 = 73, 84.6, 92.49, 98.31, 102.82f g
with probabilities 0, 0.02, 0.153, 0.3, 0.527ð Þ.20 Given H*i, 2 p1ð Þ, it is worthwhile
for a player to observe the price if and only if vi > vt = 2 = 99.07, where vt = 2
solves πijH*i, 2 p1ð Þ
 
=0. Therefore, agent 3 now decides to remain inactive
whereas agent 4 observes the price, discovers p*2 = 91.49 such that p
*
2 < v4,
and thus buys the item. The auction closes and payoffs are u1 = 0, u2 = − 2,
u3 = 0, u4 = 36.51, and us = 95.49.
Example 3 showswhich forces drive the Bayesian updating of agents’ beliefs. On the
one hand, learning that a rival observed the price and did not buy the item brings
good news, as this implies that the price fell by Δ. As such, the support of possible
prices shifts to the left. On the other hand, the fact that the rival who observed the
price did not buy the itemmeans that the actual price that he discovered was higher
than his valuation, where the latter was certainly above the entry threshold vt = 1. As
such, the probability distribution becomes more skewed towards high values. For
standard values of the parameters (small Δ, see footnote 1), the latter effect dom-
inates such that the expected price, as well as the threshold vt that makes the choice
to observe the price worthwhile, weakly increases over time. Figure 2 below illus-
trates the effects of these two conflicting forces in the context of Example 3.
The way agents update their beliefs about the hidden price implies that, in
equilibrium, two further results hold. First, an agent that is willing to observe
the price in a given period but does not get the opportunity to do so may decide
not to observe the price in subsequent periods, because the threshold vt that
solves condition πijH*i, t pt − 1ð Þ
 
=0 increases over time. As such, a player may
have a valuation vt < vi < vt′ with t
′ > t (this is the case of agent 3 in Example 3).
20 At t = 2, agents 3 and 4 assign probability 1 to the event that the valuation of the agent that
observed the price (i. e., agent 2) is such that v2 2 83, 102.8½ . The lower bound follows from the
fact that the agent observed the price. The upper bound follows from the fact that the agent did
not buy the item. Given the support Sp*1 , it thus immediately follows that h
*
i, 2 73ð Þ=0. Then,
under which conditions would agent 2 have refused to buy the item if the price that he
discovered was 84.6? By expression [3], this would have happened if v2 2 83, 84.6½ , an event
with probability F 84.6ð Þ− F 83ð ÞF 102.8ð Þ− F 83ð Þ =0.008; however, if v2 2 83, 84.6½ , then agent 2 would have
refused to buy the item even if he discovered a price p*1 2 92.49, 98.31, 102.82f g. As such,
h*i, 2 84.6ð Þ= 0.084 = 0.02. Similarly, agent 2 would have refused to buy the item if p*1 = 92.49 if
(as before) v2 2 83, 84.6½ , as well as if v2 2 84.6, 92.49½ . The latter event has probability
F 92.49ð Þ− F 84.6ð Þ
F 102.8ð Þ− F 83ð Þ =0.398; however, a valuation v2 2 84.6, 92.49½  would have led agent 2 to refuse
to buy the item even if p*1 2 98.31, 102.82f g. As such, h*i, 2 92.49ð Þ=0.02 + 0.3983 = 0.153. Similar
computations lead to define the distribution 0, 0.02, 0.153, 0.3, 0.527ð Þ.
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Second, no agent that is unwilling to observe the price in a given period will
decide to observe the price in subsequent periods. The intuition is the following.
A player plays a*1i, t = ; if his expected payoff from observing the price is negative,
i. e., if vi < vt. Now suppose that in period t
′ > t, agent i observes that the auction
is still open. The player realizes that two paths may have occurred: (1) No rival
observed the price in any of the previous periods. If this was the case, then i‘s
beliefs would not change and thus the expected payoff of playing a*1i, t′ ≠ ; would
remain negative as it was in t. (2) Some other player observed the price in some
of the previous periods. However, if this was the case, the agents that observed
the price necessarily refused to buy the item, otherwise the auction would have
closed. Moreover, if a player j 2 N observed the price in period t′′ 2 t, ..., t′ ,
then it must be the case that vj > vt′′ , which in turn implies vj > vi given that
vt′′ ≥ vt. The fact that j did not buy the item thus indicates that, a fortiori, agent i
would find the transaction unattractive.
A noticeable feature of the equilibrium is that it remains optimal for the agents
to play b*ðviÞ= vi. In other words, and despite the fact that, in equilibrium, the
price may actually fall, agents’ gross willingness to pay still coincides with their
valuation. The reason is that in a PRA, the price falls endogenously in response to
agents’ behavior, rather than exogenously, as it does in a standard Dutch auction.
Indeed, the probability that the price falls (i. e., the probability that one or more
rivals observe the price and then do not buy the item) is too low to justify a strategy
b′ðviÞ < b*ðviÞ= vi. We discuss this result in more detail in the proof of Proposition 3;
however, as an informative example, consider a hypothetical PRA in which there
are n participants but only agent i has a valuation vi > vt = 1. Assume moreover that
the initial price is such that b′ðviÞ− c < p*1 nð Þ ≤ vi − c. If the price was falling exo-
genously, the current price p*t nð Þ would eventually reach a level p*t nð Þ ≤ b′ðviÞ− c.
Agent i would then enjoy a more substantial surplus by playing b′ðviÞ rather than
b*ðviÞ. However, in a PRA, the price remains stuck at the initial level and thus
74 84.6 85.6 92.49 93.49 98.31 99.31 102.82103.82
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Figure 2: Updating of agents’ beliefs.
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reaches b′ðviÞ with zero probability. Therefore, b*ðviÞ dominates b′ðviÞ, as the
former leads to ui = vi − p*1 nð Þ− c with ui ≥0, whereas the latter leads to u′i =0.
We conclude the analysis of the mechanism by studying its profitability. The
fact that, in equilibrium, multiple entries can occur benefits the seller, as revenues
increase by ðc−ΔÞ > 0 every time an agent observes the price. Indeed, the follow-
ing Lemma shows that a PRA with uncertainty about the number of participants
raises higher expected revenues than a PRA in which n is common knowledge.21
Lemma 3: Consider a PRA with n participants. Let PRA nð Þ denote the case in
which n is common knowledge and PRA ~nð Þ the case in which, from the buyers’
point of view, the number of participants is a random variable with mean n. Then,
πPRAð~nÞ >πPRAðnÞ, i. e., PRA ~nð Þ yields higher expected revenues than PRA nð Þ.
Proof: In PRA nð Þ the optimal initial price p*0 nð Þ is as defined in Proposition 1. Given
p*0 nð Þ, let v nð Þ solve ui p*0 nð Þ
 
= v nð Þ− p*0 nð Þ+Δ− c=0. Now consider PRA ~nð Þwhere
by construction
P~nmax
~nmin
~ng ~nð Þ= n. Let vi = v nð Þ and evaluate πijH*i, 1 p0ð Þ
 
where
H*i, 1 p0ð Þ is as defined in Proposition 3. By Lemma 1, p*0 ~nð Þ < p*0 nð Þ for any ~n < n and
p*0 ~nð Þ > p*0 nð Þ for any ~n > n. Then, ui p*0 ~nð Þ
 
= − c whenever ~n > n while
ui p*0 ~nð Þ
 
= v nð Þ− p*0 ~nð Þ +Δ− c > 0 whenever ~n < n. It follows that πijHi, 1 p0ð Þð Þ =P~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð Þui p*0 ~nð Þ
 
> 0. Given that πijH*i, 1 p0ð Þ
 
is strictly increasing in vi, it then
must be the case that πijH*i, 1 p0ð Þ
 
=0 if and only if agent i has a valuation
v ~nð Þ < v nð Þ. In other words, the valuation that makes an agent indifferent between
observing the price or not is lower when the number of participants is uncertain.
Now consider any profile of valuations v1, ..., vnð Þ where without loss of generality
v1 < ... < vn. Three situations may occur: (a) vn < vð~nÞ < vðnÞ and thus
usjPRA ~nð Þ = usjPRA nð Þ =0; (b) vð~nÞ < vn < vðnÞ and thus usjPRA ~nð Þ > 0 and usjPRA nð Þ =0; (c)
vð~nÞ < vðnÞ < vn and thus usjPRA ~nð Þ > 0, usjPRA nð Þ > 0, and usjPRA ~nð Þ ≥ usjPRA nð Þ as multiple
observations can occur in PRA ~nð Þ. Therefore, PRA ~nð Þ raises actual revenues that are
weakly larger than those that PRA nð Þ raises. It follows that πPRAð~nÞ >πPRAðnÞ, i. e.,
PRA ~nð Þ yields larger expected revenues than PRA nð Þ.
The lower bound on the revenues that a PRA with uncertainty about n can raise
is thus given by usjPRA nð Þ = p*0 nð Þ+ c−Δ. As for the upper bound, notice that in
every round in which tied players update their beliefs, the probability of at least
one of the possible prices (namely, the lowest one) drops to zero. Given that the
number of possible initial prices coincides with the number of possible realiza-
tions of the random variable ~N, it follows that revenues can at most reach the
21 Such a result is in line with the literature that shows how the strategic obfuscation of some
aspects of the allocation procedure can benefit the seller (e. g., Gabaix and Laibson 2006).
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level usjPRA ~nð Þ = p*0 nð Þ+ ~Nn


 

 c−Δð Þ, where ~Nn = ~nmin, ..., nf g is the set of possible
realizations of ~N that are smaller or equal than the actual number of buyers n.
This latter result implies that, in some (highly specific) situations, a PRA
with uncertainty about n may revenue dominate standard auction formats.
Necessary conditions for this to happen are the following:
(1) Buyers’ uncertainty about n is highly pronounced (i. e., the distribution of
~N has a large variance),
(2) The true number of participants (i. e., the actual realization of ~N) is very large.
Indeed, as the number of participants gets larger, the revenue gap between a
PRA where n is common knowledge and a standard auction shrinks (see Section
3.2). At the same time, the possibility that there are multiple players that are
simultaneously willing to observe the price increases. However, if the distribution
of ~N has a high variance, so does the distribution that captures agents’ beliefs
about the hidden price. It follows that the chances that a player who observes the
price refuses to buy the item become non-negligible. As such, the seller may collect
multiple fees and the accrual of these fees may more than compensate for the fact
that the expected selling price in a PRA is lower than in a standard auction.
Conditional on the occurrence of the two above-mentioned necessary conditions,
the expected revenues of PRA ~nð Þ may even exceed agents’ maximal valuation v.
The following example illustrates this possibility. The example also highlights how
the ranking of the different mechanisms depends on both the specific character-
istics of the distribution of ~N and the actual realization of n.
Example 4: Consider two versions of a PRAwith F⁓U 0, 150½ , vs =0, c= 2, and Δ= 1.
– In the first version, agents believe that the random variable ~N is distributed
over the support S~N = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5f g with g ~nð Þ=0.2 for every ~n 2 S~N. The actual
number of participants is n= 3. Therefore (see examples 1, 2, and 3),
πPRAðnÞ = 70.87, πPRAð~nÞ = 72.05, and πFPA = πSPA = 81.25. It follows that
v >πFPA = πSPA >πPRAð~nÞ >πPRAðnÞ.
– In the second version, agents instead believe that ~N is distributed over
S~N = 3, 5, 10, 30, 2999f g with g ~nð Þ=0.2 for every ~n 2 S~N. The actual number
of participants is n= 2999. In such a case, πPRAðnÞ = 149.55, πPRAð~nÞ = 151.26,
and πFPA = πSPA = 149.9. It follows that πPRAð~nÞ > v >πFPA =πSPA >πPRAðnÞ.
4 Robustness of the Equilibria
In this section, we investigate the robustness of the equilibria identified in
Propositions 1 and 3 to a number of generalizations:
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4.1 Random Arrival of Buyers
Assume a new buyer j becomes aware of the auction at a certain period t′ > 1. If
t′ > te, then the auction has already closed and nothing changes in the equili-
brium strategies played by the incumbent players. However, propositions 1 and
3 continue to hold even if t′ ≤ te. Consider first the case in which n is common
knowledge: player j (the ðn+ 1Þth agent) observes that the auction is still open
at t′, correctly sets p*t′ − 1 = p
*
0 where p
*
0 is as defined in Proposition 1, and then
plays accordingly; he observes the price and buys the item in t′ if πjjp*t′ − 1
 
> 0,
whereas he remains idle and plays aj, t = ;, ;ð Þ for any t ≥ t′ otherwise. As such,
the arrival of new participants can change te, but neither modifies the structure
of the equilibrium nor makes the mechanism more profitable. Similarly, if n is
a random variable, player j computes πjjH*j, t′ pt′ − 1ð Þ
	 
as defined in Proposition
3 and then plays according to equilibrium. Notice that, in this case, the arrival
of a new agent can modify the profitability of the mechanism. More precisely,
the seller’s profits can be enhanced (the new entrant observes the price and
decides not to buy the item), penalized (the entrant observes the price and
buys the item, pre-empting future observations by other players), or unaffected
(the entrant does not observe the price).
4.2 Strategic Choice of c and Δ
Assume that at t =0 the seller chooses not only the initial price p0 2 0, v½  but
also the amount of the fee c and the size of the price decrease Δ. As far as the
condition Δ < c continues to hold, the qualitative features of the equilibria do not
change; however, the choice of c and Δ clearly affects expected revenues. In
particular, the seller must balance two conflicting forces. On one hand, a higher
c (holding fixed Δ) decreases πijHi, t pt − 1ð Þð Þ (see expression 1) and thus makes
the equilibrium outcome in which the item remains unsold more likely. On the
other hand, a higher c increases the marginal revenue (c−Δ) of each price
observation. The effects of Δ (holding fixed c) are symmetric. A higher Δ favors
participation but impairs the term (c−Δ). Players’ incentives and the equilibria
of the game radically change if one instead allows for the possibility that Δ > c. If
this is the case, the private marginal benefit of observing the price exceeds its
cost. Then, an agent who happens to be the unique participant could drive p*t
down to zero by observing the price p
*
0
Δ times. This strategy costs an amount
p*0
Δ c
and thus ensures positive profits as far as p
*
0
Δ c < vi. With multiple participants, the
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game becomes more complicated, as obvious pre-emption issues arise. We
conjecture that, in equilibrium, agents would buy the item whenever they dis-
cover a price p*t ≤ b
* við Þ where b* við Þ optimally solves the trade-off between the
payoff the agent gets in case he wins and the risk of being preempted by a rival.
As such, b* við Þ < vi and agents’ behavior would thus become similar to the one
that characterizes a standard descending price auction. Which of the two ver-
sions of the mechanism (Δ < c vs. Δ > c) yield higher revenues is a question that
can then also be assessed through an experiment.
4.3 Different Information Structure
Section 3.2 defined the equilibrium of a PRA when the number of participants is
common knowledge. Section 3.3 postulated instead that the seller knows n with
certainty, whereas buyers do not. What would happen in a situation in which it
is common knowledge that all the players are equally uninformed about n? To
answer this question, let the non-degenerate probability mass function g ð Þ now
describe the beliefs about the number of participants of both the buyers and the
seller. As in Section 3.3, S~N = ~nmin, ... , ~nmaxf g with ~nmin ≥ 1 denotes the support of
g ð Þ. The seller would then set the price that maximizes his expected profits
πs = 1− F p0 −Δ+ cð Þ½ n
 ðp0 −Δ+ c− vsÞ
where n=
P~nmax
~n= ~nmin
~n  g ~nð Þ is the expected value of the random variable ~N.
Buyers then correctly anticipate the price p*0 nð Þ and thus behave as described
in Proposition 1.
4.4 Other Sources of Uncertainty
We showed that the lack of common knowledge about the initial price p*0 is a
necessary condition to potentially trigger multiple price observations and thus
enhance expected revenues. In the model, buyers’ uncertainty about p*0 origi-
nated from their uncertainty about the number of participants. However, uncer-
tainty about the seller’s valuation (vs) would trigger similar dynamics, as
different valuations lead to different initial prices (see expression 4).22 Buyers
would then still behave as discussed in Section 3.3. First, they use the distribu-
tion of vs to compute the distribution of p*0. Then, they are willing to observe the
price if and only if such an action leads to a positive expected payoff. Finally,
22 I thank an anonymous referee for having suggested this point.
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they buy the item if and only if such an action leads to a positive actual payoff.
Notice that, in addition to the lack of perfect information about n and vs, the PRA
mechanism also embeds a further source of uncertainty. This stems from the
possibility of ties: an agent that is willing to observe the price (and thus in
principle willing to buy the item) faces the risk of not being able to do so
because the seller may assign this right to another buyer. In this respect, this
kind of uncertainty seems thus similar to the risk of incurring into rationing that
characterizes any allocation procedure (e. g., a situation of excess demand in a
posted price mechanism). Moreover, the payoffs consequences of losing in a tie
are null as a buyer pays the fee c if and only if he actually observes the price.
Because of these reasons, we conjecture that the effects of this source of
uncertainty on agents’ behavior should be minimal.
4.5 Risk Attitudes of the Buyers
Since the PRA mechanism features some uncertainty (see the paragraph above),
buyers’ risk attitudes matter. In particular, and given the peculiar nature of a PRA
and the self-selection of the participants, it is conceivable that some buyers are risk
lovers rather than risk neutral. Clearly, a risk-loving agent can be more inclined to
observe the hidden price and this may enhance the mechanism’s expected profit-
ability. More formally, if the agent is risk lover, the threshold valuation v′ that
solves the condition πijH*i, t pt − 1ð Þ
 
=0 will be such that v′t < vt. It is then possible
that v′t < vi < vt, i. e., a risk-neutral agent with valuation vi would not observe the
price whereas his risk-loving counterpart would. Related to this point, notice that
in principle the seller could exploit the fact that some buyers are risk lovers by
artificially increasing the level of uncertainty in the game. Consider for instance the
case in which all the parameters of the game are common knowledge. The seller
might then announce that the realization of the initial price p*0 will be drawn from
a commonly known distribution. However, in the current design of the mechanism
and in the absence of delegation, the seller lacks commitment power such that his
announcement would not be credible. Indeed, the seller would have an incentive
to select the unique initial price that maximizes his expected payoff rather than
honestly rely on the announced probability distribution.
4.6 Behavioral Biases of the Buyers
Similarly to other pay-per-bid auction formats, a PRA can trigger and exploit a
number of behavioral biases of the participants. Clearly, the mechanism tickles
participants’ curiosity. As such, biases such as wishful thinking, optimism, and
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over confidence, may lead players to hold biased beliefs ~Hi, t pt − 1ð Þ that erroneously
lead to more favorable expected outcomes, i. e., πij~Hi, t pt − 1ð Þ
 
> πijH*i, t pt − 1ð Þ
 
.
Behavioral agents may thus decide to observe the hidden price more easily and/or
more often than what equilibrium analysis prescribes. Moreover, an agent that
observes the price but then decides not to buy the item may fall victim to the sunk-
cost fallacy (Shubik 1971) and thus invest additional money in the hope of even-
tually finding a good deal and recovering the sunk costs.
5 Conclusions
We studied the theoretical properties of a specific example of pay-per-bid mechan-
isms, the so-called price reveal auction. We showed that when there is common
knowledge about the number of participants, the format basically replicates the
outcome that would emerge in a posted price mechanism. In particular, in
equilibrium, a PRA attracts at most one active buyer and raises lower expected
revenues than a standard auction. We then investigated a situation in which
buyers are uncertain about the number of participants and showed that in such
a case a PRA can trigger multiple price observations even on the equilibrium path.
This enhances expected revenues up to the point that, under some (highly)
specific conditions, a PRA may revenue dominate standard auction formats.
Acknowledgements: I thank Dino Gerardi, Toomas Hinnosaar and two anon-
ymous referees for useful comments as well as seminar participants at the
Collegio Carlo Alberto and at the UECE Lisbon Meetings in Game Theory and
Applications for helpful discussion.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We divide the proof in a number of steps.
(1) The choice of the optimal initial price p*0.
Conditional on bidders’ subsequent behavior, the optimal initial price p*0
maximizes the seller’s expected profits πs p0ð Þ. These are given by:
πs p0ð Þ= 1− F v p0ð Þð Þ½ nð Þðp0 −Δ+ c− vsÞ [5]
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The first term on the RHS of eq. [5] is the probability that there exists at
least one bidder whose valuation vi is such that vi > vðp0Þ where vðp0Þ is the
valuation of an hypothetical agent who is indifferent between buying the
good at t = 1 at price p1 = p0 −Δ and not entering the auction. More formally,
b*ðvðp0ÞÞ− c= p0 −Δ where b*ðvðp0ÞÞ is the agent’s optimal bid. Therefore,
vðp0Þ= b*− 1ðp0 −Δ+ cÞ. The second term on the RHS of eq. [5] is the payoff
the seller realizes if he sells the good at price p1 = p0 −Δ (i. e., to the first
agent who observes the price). The optimal initial price is thus given by:
p*0 = arg max
p02 vs +Δ− c, b* vð Þ+Δ − c½ 
πs p0ð Þ [6]
(2) Existence of p*0.
The lower bound of the interval vs +Δ− c, b*ðvÞ+Δ− c
 
ensures that the
payoff is non-negative while the upper bound is required for the probability
to be well-defined. The function [5] is continuous and the interval, which
we will show that in equilibrium always exists, is closed and bounded. By
the extreme value theorem, it follows that p*0 certainly exists.
(3) Uniqueness of p*0.
Define δ p0ð Þ= 1− F v p0ð Þð Þ½ nð Þ and μ p0ð Þ= ðp0 −Δ+ c− vsÞ such that eq. [5]
can be expressed as πs p0ð Þ= δ p0ð Þμ p0ð Þ. The functions δ p0ð Þ and μ p0ð Þ are
concave (in particular δ′′ p0ð Þ < 0 for any n ≥ 2 and μ′′ p0ð Þ=0). Now consider
the interval α, β½  with α= vs +Δ− c and β= b*ðvÞ+Δ− c. The following con-
ditions hold:
(i) δ p0ð Þ and μ p0ð Þ are nonnegative on α, β½ ;
(ii) δ αð Þμ αð Þ = δ βð Þμ βð Þ=0;
(iii) δ′ p0ð Þμ′ p0ð Þ= − n F v p0ð Þð Þ½ n− 1f v p0ð Þð Þv′ðp0Þ < 0 on α, βð Þ.
Because of (ii) and Rolle’s theorem, there certainly exists a p^0 2 α, β½  such
that π′s p^0ð Þ=0. Now evaluate the second derivative of πs p0ð Þ at p0 = p^0. This
is given by π′′s p^0ð Þ= δ′′ p^0ð Þμ p^0ð Þ+ 2δ′ p^0ð Þμ′ p^0ð Þ+ δ p^0ð Þμ′′ p^0ð Þ. Condition i),
paired with the concavity of δ p0ð Þ and μ p0ð Þ, implies that the first and the
third terms of π′′s p^0ð Þ are non positive. Condition iii) implies that the second
term is strictly negative. Then, π′′s p^0ð Þ < 0 such that p^0 is a maximum, i. e.,
p^0 = p*0. Moreover, and given that π
′′
s p0ð Þ < 0 for every p0 2 α, βð Þ, the func-
tion πs p0ð Þ is strictly concave and therefore p*0 is unique.
(4) Buyers’ behavior.
Given that agents know p*0, their initial beliefs are captured by the (degenerate)
distribution H*i, 1 p0ð Þ with h*i, 1 p*0
 
= 1 for every i 2 N. Buyers’ behavior is then
optimal given these beliefs and the latter are consistent. In particular, an agent
i for whom πijH*i, 1 pt − 1ð Þ
 
> 0 plays first a*1i, 1 =wto and then, in case i= i^t,
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a*2i, 1 = γ ð Þwith γ p*1
 
= 1. On the contrary, an agent for whom πijH*i, 1 pt − 1ð Þ
 
≤0
plays a*i, 1 = ;, ;ð Þ. The latter remains an equilibrium for every t given that Δ < c
and therefore the private benefits of observing pt are smaller than the cost. If
the auction is still open at generic period ~t > 1, bidders correctly infer that
a*i, t = ;, ;ð Þ for any i and any t 2 1, ...,~t − 1
 
. Therefore,H*i, t pt − 1ð Þ is such that
h*i, t pt − 1 = p
*
0
 
= 1 and thus a*
i,~t
= ;, ;ð Þ for any i.
Finally, given that ui =0 is the payoff of a bidder who plays a*i, t
 T
t = 1
with a*i, t = ;, ;ð Þ at any t and that on the equilibrium path p*t − 1 = p*0 for any
t, it follows that b*ðviÞ= vi. Every b′ðviÞ≠ vi is in fact (weakly) dominated.
First, let b′ðviÞ > vi: strategies b′ðviÞ and b*ðviÞ lead to the same payoff unless
b′ðviÞ > p*0 + c−Δ > b*ðviÞ. If this is the case, a bidder who plays b*ðviÞ does
not enter the auction and gets ui =0, while a bidder who plays b′ðviÞ
observes p*0 and then either gets u
′
i = vi − p
*
0 +Δ− c < 0 (the agent buys the
item) or u′′i = − c (the agent does not buy the item). Alternatively, let
b′ðviÞ < vi: strategies b′ðviÞ and b*ðviÞ lead to the same payoff unless
b*ðviÞ > p*0 + c−Δ > b′ðviÞ. If this is the case, a bidder who plays b*ðviÞ
observes p*0, buys the item, and gets ui = vi − p
*
0 +Δ− c > 0 while a bidder
who plays b′ðviÞ does not enter the auction and gets u′i =0.
By substituting vðp0Þ= b*− 1ðp0 −Δ+ cÞ and b* − 1ðviÞ= vi (the latter fol-
lows from b*ðviÞ= vi) in eq. [5], one gets:
p*0 = arg max
p02 vs +Δ − c,v + Δ− c½ 
1− F p0 −Δ+ cð Þ½ nð Þðp0 −Δ+ c− vsÞ
and the interval for p0 always exists given that v ≥ vs. ■
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1. The main differences concern
buyers’ initial beliefs about the hidden price and how these evolve over time. We
thus focus on these aspects. Again, we divide the proof in a number of steps.
(1) Buyers’ initial beliefs.
Buyers do not know n and thus cannot infer p*0. However, by knowing that
the random variable ~N is distributed over the support S~N = ~nmin, ..., ~nmaxf g
with probability mass function g ð Þ, they can compute the distribution of
p0. In particular, players compute p*0 ~nð Þ for every ~n 2 S~N where each p*0 ~nð Þ
(i. e., the optimal initial price that the seller would set if the actual number
of participants was ~n) is given by:
p*0 ~nð Þ= arg max
p02 vs +Δ − c, v +Δ − c½ 
1− F p0 −Δ+ cð Þ½ ~n
	 
ðp0 −Δ+ c− vsÞ
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Buyers’ initial beliefs are then captured by the distribution H*i, 1ðp0Þ that
assigns probability mass function h*i, 1 p
*
0 ~nð Þ
 
= g ~nð Þ for every ~n 2 S~N .
(2) Optimality of b*ðviÞ= vi.
We show that any b′ðviÞ ≠ vi is weakly dominated by b*ðviÞ= vi. Notice that
the choice of one’s own gross willingness to pay bðviÞ influences two
aspects of agent’s behavior. First, it affects the decision to observe the
hidden price (see expressions 1 and 2 in the main text). Second, it deter-
mines the purchasing decision (see expression 3).
(2a) Consider first any b′ðviÞ > b*ðviÞ= vi. Strategies b′ðviÞ and b*ðviÞ lead
to the same payoff unless there exists a price p**0 ~nð Þ 2 p*0 ~nminð Þ, ...,

p*0 ~nmaxð Þg such that b′ðviÞ− c > p**0 ~nð Þ−Δ > b*ðviÞ− c. If this is the case,
qi, 1 p**1 ~nð Þjb′ðviÞ
 
= 1 while qi, 1 p**1 ~nð Þjb*ðviÞ
 
=0. Given that by assumption
vi − p**0 ~nð Þ+Δ− c < 0, b′ðviÞ lowers πijHi, t pt − 1ð Þð Þ such that a player may
decide not to observe the price even if such a choice is worthwhile in
expected terms. Moreover, say that b′ðviÞ and b*ðviÞ are such that the agent
decides to observe the price in both cases. Then, with probability g ~nð Þ > 0, the
price that the agent discovers is p**1 ~nð Þ= p**0 ~nð Þ−Δ. An agent that sets b′ðviÞ
buys the item even if this leads to u′i < − c. On the contrary, an agent that sets
b*ðviÞ does not buy the item and thus gets u*i = − c. Therefore, u*i > u′i.
(2b) Consider now any b′ðviÞ < b*ðviÞ= vi and assume by now that in
equilibrium the price cannot fall. Then, a similar argument as the one
discussed in (2a) applies. Strategies b′ðviÞ and b*ðviÞ lead to the same payoff
unless there exists a price p**0 ~nð Þ such that b′ðviÞ− c < p**0 ~nð Þ−Δ < b*ðviÞ− c. If
this is the case then b′ðviÞ may lead an agent to decide to observe the price
even if the expected payoff associated with such a choice is negative.
Moreover, in case both b*ðviÞ and b′ðviÞ lead the agent to observe the price,
with probability g ~nð Þ > 0 the latter happens to be p**1 ~nð Þ= p**0 ~nð Þ−Δ. Then, an
agent that sets b′ðviÞ does not buy the item and gets u′i = − c whereas an agent
that sets b*ðviÞ buys the item and gets u*i = vi − p**1 ~nð Þ− c. Therefore, u*i > u′i.
However, the peculiarity of a PRA in which buyers are uncertain about
the number of participants is that in equilibrium the price may fall. Therefore,
even if p**0 ~nð Þ is such that the condition b′ðviÞ − c < p**0 ~nð Þ−Δ < b*ðviÞ− c initi-
ally holds, the current price p**t ~nð Þ may eventually reach a level
p**t ~nð Þ < b′ðviÞ− c. If such an event occurs, an agent who plays b′ðviÞ could
in principle buy the item in period t and thus get u′i = vi − p
**
t ~nð Þ− c.23 An
agent who instead plays b*ðviÞ buys the item in t = 1 with u*i = vi − p**1 ~nð Þ− c.
23 Notice that we are still assuming that agent observes the price, and thus pays the fee, only
once. The proof that follows holds a fortiori in case the agent observes the price and pays the
fee multiple times.
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Given that p**t ~nð Þ ≤ p**0 ~nð Þ, condition u′i > u*i may occur. In what follows, we
evaluate the marginal benefits and marginal costs associated with agent i‘s
decision of playing b′ðviÞ rather than b*ðviÞ. We show that the probability that
the hidden price reaches a level p**t ~nð Þ < b′ við Þ− c is too low such that in
expectations b* við Þ dominates b′ við Þ. The rules of the PRA mechanism imply
that a necessary condition for the price to fall and eventually reach the level
p**t ~nð Þ is that some players observe the price and then refuse to buy the item.
Consider thus the situation of generic buyer i who evaluates the pros and
cons of postponing his decision to observe the price in the hope that this will
fall. If agent i remains inactive (i. e., he plays ai, 1 = ;, ;ð Þ), then, from his point
of view, the following events may occur:
(a) No agent j≠ i observes the price. The event has probability
X~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð ÞF vt = 1ð Þ~n− 1
(b) An agent j≠ i observes the price. The event has probability
1−
X~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð ÞF vt = 1ð Þ~n− 1
In case event (b) occurs then the following may happen:
(b1) Agent j buys the item. The event has probability
X~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð Þmin F vð Þ− F p
*
0 ~nð Þ
 
F vð Þ− F vt = 1ð Þ
, 1
 
(b2) Agent j does not buy the item. The event has probability
1−
X~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð Þmin F vð Þ− F p
*
0 ~nð Þ
 
F vð Þ− F vt = 1ð Þ
, 1
 
The only favorable event for agent i is (b2) where indeed the price falls by Δ and
the auction remains open. The expected marginal benefit from not observing the
price is thus given by:
1−
X~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð ÞF vt = 1ð Þ~n− 1
 !
1−
X~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð Þmin F vð Þ− F p
*
0 ~nð Þ
 
F vð Þ − F vt = 1ð Þ
, 1
  !
 Δ [7]
The expected marginal cost (foregone positive payoff) is instead given by:
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X~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð ÞF vt = 1ð Þ~n− 1 +X  Y
 !
 vi − p*0 ~nð Þ +Δ− c
 
[8]
where
X = 1−
X~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð ÞF vt = 1ð Þ~n− 1
 !
and
Y =
X~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð Þmin F vð Þ− F p
*
0 ~nð Þ
 
F vð Þ− F vt = 1ð Þ
, 1
  !

Given that:
(a)
P~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð ÞF vt = 1ð Þ~n− 1 > 0,
(b)
P~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð Þmin F vð Þ− F p
*
0 ~nð Þð Þ
F vð Þ− F vt = 1ð Þ , 1
 
> 1−
P~nmax
~nmin
g ~nð Þmin F vð Þ− F p
*
0 ~nð Þð Þ
F vð Þ− F vt = 1ð Þ , 1
 
(in expectations an agent that observes the price is more likely to buy
the item rather than not), and
(c) vi − p*0 ~nð Þ+Δ− c
 
>Δ (by assumption of case 3b), it follows that [8] >
[7]. Therefore, the deviation to b′ðviÞ < b*ðviÞ is not profitable and in
equilibrium b*ðviÞ= vi.
(3) The choice of the optimal initial price p*0.
The seller knows n with certainty. Moreover, in equilibrium agents still play
b*ðviÞ= vi (see point 2 above). The seller’s problem is thus analogous to the one
described in Proposition 1: to choose the price that maximizes expected profits
given that there are n participants who play b* við Þ= vi and whose private valua-
tions are independently drawn from F. The optimal initial price is thus given by:
p*0 = arg max
p02 vs +Δ − c,v + Δ− c½ 
1− F p0 −Δ+ cð Þ½ nð Þðp0 −Δ+ c− vsÞ
The price p*0 exists and is unique (see the proof of Proposition 1). ■
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